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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 930588-CA 
V. : Priority No. 2 
JAMES J. CONTREL, 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1993), in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Ray M. Harding, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues were presented to the trial court 
below and were properly preserved for appellate review under 
defendant's conditional guilty plea: 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
investigating officers had a reasonable suspicion of narcotics 
trafficking to support stopping defendant's truck? A trial 
court's determination of whether an investigative stop was 
supported by reasonable suspicion is a conclusion of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994). The trial court's ruling is, however, should not be 
subjected to "a close, de novo review." Id. Rather, some 
deference is accorded the trial court because the reasonable 
suspicion standard itself conveys a measure of discretion to 
trial courts so that they can "grapple with the multitude of fact 
patterns that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion 
determination." Id. at 939-40. The trial court's findings on 
purely factual issues, such as witness credibility and historical 
facts, are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 93 9 n.4. 
2. Does article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
require that the State prove that defendant was aware of his 
right to refuse a request to search before his consent to search 
can be deemed valid? The trial court's refusal to depart from 
the federal voluntariness of consent standard is the result of 
the interpretation of a constitutional provision, which is a pure 
question of law that is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard with no deference accorded the trial court. State v. 
Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Except for a few inconsequential grammatical 
differences, the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
are identical: 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
2 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article 1/ Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of 
a controlled substance (marijuana), a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1993) (R. 
1). Defendant moved to suppress the over 10 0 pounds of marijuana 
that were seized during a consensual search of the pickup truck 
he was driving at the time he was stopped (R. 19-41) . After an 
evidentiary hearing and submission of memorandum, the trial court 
denied defendant's motion and entered a memorandum decision 
specifying its reasons for so ruling (R. 57-60) . It subsequently 
entered a signed order denying defendant's motion (R. 61) and 
made written findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 62-5) . 
(The court's decision, order, and findings are attached hereto as 
Addendum A, B and C, respectively). 
Defendant entered a negotiated plea agreement in which 
the State reduced the charge to a third degree felony and allowed 
defendant to condition his plea on the right to appeal the denial 
of his motion to suppress (R. 74-81). The trial court accepted 
3 
the plea agreement and sentenced defendant to a term of zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison and ordered defendant to pay 
a fine of $5,000.00 (R. 100-01). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the hearings below, Sergeant Paul Mangelson, one of 
the investigating officers, was the only person to testify. 
Based on Sergeant Mangelson's uncontroverted testimony, the trial 
court entered extensive findings of facts (R. 62-65) . See 
Addendum C. Those findings are reproduced below. 
1. On February 4, 1992 Sergeant Paul Mangelson, a 25 
year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol [,] was patrolling 1-15 
within Juab County together with Trooper Lance Bushnell. 
2. Both Sergeant Mangelson and Trooper Bushnell have 
had extensive training and experience in the area of drug law 
enforcement and drug identification. Sergeant Mangelson has been 
involved in many cases involving compartments within motor 
vehicles used to conceal controlled substances. 
3. While patrolling, Sergeant Mangelson observed a 
northbound pickup truck, and made the following observations 
prior to stopping the vehicle: 
a. The vehicle was a 1990 Chevrolet pickup. 
b. The edge of the rear bumper had been bent 
[upward at a 45 degree angel] so as to conceal the area behind 
it. 
c. The gas tank was much lower than that of a 
stock model truck. 
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d. The vehicle had been recently undercoated 
(observable in the rear tire area). 
e. Unlike stock model vehicles, the vehicle had 
no air space between the truck bed and the frame. 
f. [Unlike stock model vehicles, the] vehicle 
also had bright yellow, oversized shock absorbers, a bed liner, 
and a tool box in the bed area. 
4. Sergeant Mangelson noted that the vehicle was 
identical in every respect (except for its color) to a vehicle he 
had seized several months earlier containing a secret compartment 
behind the bumper in which Mangelson had discovered large 
quantities of contraband. 
5. Based upon Sergeant Mangelson's observations and 
his past experience, the officers stopped the vehicle, with the 
intent to search the vehicle for a hidden compartment. 
6. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, James 
John Contrel. The driver produced a Florida driver's license and 
a Pennsylvania registration. The driver said the vehicle 
belonged to his friend Carmen, but he did not know Carmen's 
address or telephone number. 
7. The officer asked the defendant if he was 
transporting drugs or if there were any firearms or contraband in 
the vehicle. The defendant replied "No". The officer then asked 
for consent to search the vehicle. The defendant gave consent to 
search the vehicle, both orally and in writing. 
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8. The officers then went to the rear of the vehicle 
and accessed the secret compartment, exactly as Sergeant 
Mangelson did in the previous case, and after they removed the 
cover plate, found in excess of 100 lbs. of marijuana in the 
hidden compartment. The defendant was thereafter arrested. 
(R. 62-4) 
Photographs of the altered truck driven by defendant, 
as well as a photograph of a "stock model," were admitted below, 
and Mangelson explained the significance of each photograph. See 
Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 14 and 15, which are discussed at 
pages 111 to 114 and 135 to 141 of the record. 
Based on its findings of fact, the trial court 
concluded that the stop of defendant's vehicle was supported by 
reasonable suspicion and that the scope of detention was strictly 
tied to the purpose of the stop. It further held that 
defendant's consent to search the vehicle was given voluntarily. 
Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that article I, 
section 14 of the Utah constitution required that he knowingly 
waive his right to refuse a request for consent to search in 
order for his consent to be valid (R. 65). See Addendum C. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly determined that the 
investigative stop of defendant's truck was supported by 
reasonable suspicion of narcotics trafficking. Defendant's truck 
had numerous distinctive alterations from stock models that were 
similar to those Mangelson and Bushnell had observed on other 
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trucks with concealed compartments containing contraband, and the 
truck was traveling a well known drug trafficking route. Cf. 
State v. Poole, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994) (holding that 
Sergeant Mangelson and Trooper Bushnell had probable cause to 
search truck based on facts nearly identical to those presented 
in this case). Given that the standard for establishing 
reasonable suspicion is significantly lower than that needed to 
establish probable cause, the trial court's ruling is clearly 
correct and should be affirmed. 
This Court also should uphold the trial court's refusal 
to adopt a different standard for establishing the validity of a 
consent to search under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution than is required under the fourth amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Under State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1988), it is clear that the two provisions are to be 
interpreted identically. The narrow exception to that general 
rule is for the purpose of "insulating this State's citizens from 
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given the fourth 
amendment by federal courts." Id. at 1221 n.8. The federal 
voluntariness standard for determining the validity of a consent 
to search is well-established and has been consistently applied 
since it was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973). 
Accordingly, under Watts, there is no basis for departing from 
the federal voluntariness test for consensual searches. Even if 
there were such a basis, adoption of the waiver standard 
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advocated by defendant is not supported by the state 
constitutional analysis called for under State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268 (Utah App. 1990) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
STOP OP DEFENDANT'S TRUCK WAS SUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING 
The trial court's determination that "[t]he stop of the 
subject vehicle was a constitutionally valid stop based upon 
reasonable suspicion that the subject vehicle had a hidden 
compartment containing contraband" (R. 95) was correct under 
State v. Poole, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1994) and the well-
established principle that the degree of proof needed to 
establish reasonable suspicion is significantly lower than that 
required for probable cause. 
The facts of Poole are strikingly similar to those of 
this case. In Poole, Sergeant Mangelson and Trooper Bushnell 
stopped a vehicle on 1-15 near Nephi because they suspected the 
driver was intoxicated. During the course of the stop, it became 
apparent that the truck had a hidden compartment under its bed: 
Mangelson testified that he started 
"exploring" the bed of the truck while 
Bushnell was searching the cab [pursuant to 
the driver's consent]. He examined the top 
and bottom of the flatbed and measured lines 
that were six to eight inches apart. This 
discrepancy, indicating the possibility of a 
concealed compartment, prompted Mangelson to 
continue his investigation on the theory that 
the concealed compartment likely contained 
contraband. Mangelson asked Poole to lift up 
a piece of plywood resting on the truck bed. 
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Using a screwdriver, Mangelson then pried 
open a section of metal sheeting and 
discovered a six- to eight-inch-high 
compartment beneath the flatbed. At this 
time, Poole withdrew his consent for a 
further search. However, Mangelson continued 
his search by removing the metal sheeting, 
which provided him with a clear view of 
contraband within the enclosed compartment. 
The officer ultimately retrieved almost 200 
pounds of marijuana. 
Poole, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3. 
In light of these facts, the trial court in Poole 
determined that the continued search after consent had been 
withdrawn was illegal because the officers lacked probable cause. 
Id. at 4. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
ruling because the trial court erroneously elevated the probable 
cause standard to "unrealistic heights." Id. In holding that 
the trial court's probable cause ruling was incorrect, the 
Supreme Court examined the totality of circumstances and 
identified several factors that collectively established probable 
cause: 
First and foremost, the truck had a 
significant and unusual alteration in its bed 
which was in plain view and which concealed a 
secret compartment. Second, this truck was 
traveling a known drug trafficking route. 
Third, the compartment was discovered by an 
officer with twenty-four years of experience 
in the field who had seen other false beds 
that contained contraband. Fourth, one of 
the vehicle's passengers held a large wad of 
money. Fifth, both defendants appeared 
extremely nervous during the stop. Sixth, 
the cab of the truck contained a wrench with 
a socket that matched the bolt securing the 
secret compartment. The false bed in 
connection with these other enumerated 
factors gave rise to probable cause for a 
search. Practically speaking, it was 
9 
probable that criminal activity was 
occurring. 
Poole, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4 (footnotes omitted). 
Most of the factors present in Poole are present in 
this case. First, Mangelson provided detailed testimony about 
the alterations to the truck that were plainly visible before the 
stop was initiated and explained why those alterations indicated 
the presence of a concealed compartment (R. 134-14 0) . See 
Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 14 (photographs of the altered 
vehicle driven by defendant). Second, defendant's altered truck 
was stopped on 1-15 near Nephi, a well known drug trafficking 
route. See Poole, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4, n.l. (taking judicial 
notice of "[t]he fact that Interstate 15 is an established route 
for illegal drug trafficking"). Finally, the two highly trained 
and experienced officers involved in Poole, Mangelson and 
Bushnell, completed the stop in this case. 
Unlike Poole, here the trial court only had to resolve 
the issue of whether the totality of the circumstances gave rise 
to reasonable suspicion; it did not have to address the issue of 
whether the more demanding probable cause standard had been met. 
That distinction is significant because the degree of proof 
needed to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that needed 
to establish probable cause: 
The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal 
objective justification" for making [an 
investigative] stop. That level of suspicion 
is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing 
by a preponderance of the evidence. We have 
held that probable cause means "a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a 
10 
crime will be found," and the level of 
suspicion required for a Terry stop is 
obviously less demanding than probable 
cause [.] 
United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 
(1989) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). 
Accord Terry v. Ohio,3 92 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). 
This Court has likewise held that reasonable suspicion requires 
only a minimal level of certainty by stating, in State v. Menkef 
787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990), that reasonable suspicion 
"must be based on objectives facts suggesting that the individual 
may be involved in criminal activity." 
In this case, the uncontroverted facts clearly support 
the trial court's reasonable suspicion determination. As the 
Court explained in Poole: 
The highway patrolmen here were confronted 
with an unusual adaption to a vehicle quite 
different from the standard characteristics 
of nearly every other truck on the road. 
Simply stated, people ordinarily do not carry 
legal items in the hidden compartment of a 
gas tank, the concealed portion of a hubcap, 
or, for that matter, in a secret compartment 
in the false bed of a pickup truck. 
Poole, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5.1 
1
 In this case, Mangelson testified, and the trial court 
found, that Mangelson had "been involved in many cases involving 
compartments within motor vehicles used to conceal controlled 
substances" (R. 63). Of those, seven were trucks with hidden 
"bed compartments" (R. 142). Moreover, one of the trucks in 
which Mangelson discovered a concealed compartment containing 
contraband was identical to the truck in this case in every 
respect except color (R. 64), and three others were similar. Of 
the four trucks in which Mangelson found a concealed compartment 
similar to the one in this case, all but one contained contraband 
(R. 108, 142, 153). 
XI 
The presence of a concealed compartment as recognized 
by highly trained and experienced officers who had previously 
retrieved contraband from other similarly altered trucks 
traveling the same well established drug route easily satisfies 
the minimal objective justification standard required to 
establish reasonable suspicion. Moreover, as the trial court 
ruled: "From his personal experience with this prior case, 
Mangelson learned that the sole apparent purpose for many of the 
unique modifications [made to defendant's truck] was to conceal 
[a secret compartment] and transport contraband. Based on this 
specific prior personal experience with a virtually identical 
modified vehicle, the sergeant's suspicion was reasonable" (R. 
58). Because the totality of the circumstances known to the 
officers at the time of the stop reasonably suggested that 
criminal activity may have been afoot, the trial court's finding 
of reasonable suspicion should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHING A VALID CONSENT 
TO SEARCH UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION IS THE SAME AS THAT 
REQUIRED UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The trial court properly rejected defendant's 
invitation to interpret article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution differently than the fourth amendment of the United 
States Constitution.2 As explained below, this Court should 
2
 Defendant has elected not to challenge the trial court 
determination that defendant's consent was voluntary under the 
(continued...) 
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affirm the trial court's ruling on the ground that the narrow 
criteria for departing from federal fourth amendment 
jurisprudence articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), are not present in the context 
of consensual searches. 
In Watts, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated its 
position on the issue of how article I, section 14 should be 
interpreted in light of the fourth amendment: 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution reads nearly verbatim with the 
fourth amendment, and thus this Court had 
never drawn any distinctions between the 
protections afforded by the respective 
constitutional provisions. Rather, the Court 
has always considered the protections 
afforded to be one and the same. 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221. See also State v. Jasso, 439 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1968); State v. Criscola, 444 P.2d 517 (Utah 1968); State 
v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976) (all construing Article I, 
Section 14 as providing the same scope of protection as the 
fourth amendment). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court in Watts also noted: 
In declining to depart in this case from 
our consistent refusal heretofore to 
interpret article I, section 14 of our 
constitution in a manner different from the 
fourth amendment to the federal constitution, 
2
 (. ..continued) 
fourth amendment. Defendant's determination not challenge the 
trial court's fourth amendment ruling is well-measured given the 
uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that he consented the 
search both orally and in writing (R. 59, 64). See Exhibit 12, 
written consent form signed by defendant. Under these 
circumstances, defendant's state constitutional challenge to the 
validity of his consent is squarely before this court. 
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we have by no means ruled out the possibility 
of doing so in some future case. Indeed, 
choosing to give the Utah Constitution a 
somewhat different construction may prove to 
be an appropriate method for insulating this 
state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts. 
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221 n.8 (citations omitted). 
Significantly, the Court in Watts provided only a 
narrow basis for departing from fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
It did not indicate that departure was proper simply because some 
standard other than that adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court might be considered more desirable. Cf. Christine M. 
Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in Utah Courts, 2 Utah 
B.J., Nov. 1989, at 26 (Justice Durham cautions against state 
constitutional interpretation that is "result-oriented and 
therefore unprincipled"). Justice Stewart recently echoed 
sentiments similar to those expressed by Justice Durham: 
. . . I think it inappropriate for this Court 
to use Article I, Section 14, the Utah 
unreasonable search and seizure provision, to 
attempt to "fine tune" federal constitutional 
search and seizure law. I may, as do other 
judges, disagree from time to time with the 
United States Supreme Court on a particular 
search and seizure opinion. But in my view, 
that alone does not justify resorting to 
Article I, Section 14 to achieve a different 
result. 
Poole, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, Stewart, J., concurring. 
The Watts exception is appropriate because it strikes a 
balance between the danger of rendering result-oriented opinions 
while at the same time allowing the flexibility needed to 
simplify federal law when it becomes hopelessly confused. Since 
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Watts, both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have given 
article I, section 14 a different interpretation than that given 
to the fourth amendment in specific settings. As discussed 
below, in each instance where Utah's appellate courts have 
departed from federal search and seizure standards, they have 
done so because of inconsistencies or confusion in the federal 
analysis. 
In State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), the 
Utah Supreme Court rejected the United States Supreme Court 
ruling in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and held 
that under the state constitution, citizens have an expectation 
of privacy in their bank records such that a showing of probable 
cause is required before bank records may be seized. The 
Thompson court noted that M[t]he result reached in Miller has 
been roundly criticized" because it departed from the traditional 
expectation of privacy test enunciated in Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511-12 (1967). Thompson, 
810 P.2d at 417 (citations omitted). The Thompson court 
explained that Katz recognized that fl/what [a person] seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected,'" because "'the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places.'" Id., at 418 (quoting 
Katz, 88 S. Ct. at 511-12). In contrast, in holding that a 
depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy in his bank 
records and no standing under the fourth amendment to challenge 
their seizure, "[t]he Miller court abandoned [the Katzl 
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rationale, relying instead 'for its analysis of an expectation of 
privacy upon the ownership and possession of the records and the 
reasonable expectations of the individual.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Having identified the conflicting principles advanced 
in Katz and Miller, the Utah Supreme Court joined several other 
states that had already rejected Miller in favor of the 
traditional expectation of privacy test articulated in Katz. 
Thompson 810 P.2d at 417-18. The court then held that under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the defendants 
had standing to challenge the search and seizure of their bank 
records. Id. at 418. 
Similarly, this Court in State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 
149 (Utah App. 1991), petition for cert, dismissed as 
improvidentIv granted, 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 60 (Utah 1994), relied 
on article I, section 14 to clarify confusion caused by the 
United States Supreme Court's decision in Michigan Dep't of State 
Police v. Sitz, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). In Sitz, 
the Court considered an investigatory 
roadblock, a "sobriety checkpoint," operated 
by the Michigan State Police Department. The 
checkpoint was operated under guidelines 
created by a special state advisory committee 
composed of law enforcement officials and 
transportation researchers from the 
University of Michigan. Those guidelines 
governed checkpoint publicity, site 
selection, and police procedure at the 
checkpoint itself. 
Under the guidelines, all motorists 
traveling through the checkpoint were stopped 
and briefly checked for intoxication. Only 
if the initial examination revealed signs of 
intoxication would a motorist be directed out 
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of the traffic flow for a driver's license 
and registration check and further sobriety 
tests. . . . 
Sims, 808 P.2d at 146 (citations omitted). 
In holding that the Michigan roadblock did not violate 
the fourth amendment, the Sitz Court employed a balancing test. 
Specifically, it found that the brief detention of motorists was 
only a "slight" infringement of their fourth amendment interests 
and that that slight infringement was outweighed by "the 
magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and] the States' 
interests in eradicating it," along with the Court's assessment 
that the one and one-half percent drunk driver arrest rate 
demonstrated that the checkpoint adequately advanced that 
interest. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2485-88.3 
In contrast to the roadblock that was upheld in Sitz, 
the roadblock at issue in Sims was not conducted in accordance 
with an explicit plan, beyond a determination that all vehicles 
other than large trucks were to be stopped. Moreover, the 
roadblock was of an "all-purpose" variety. Sims, 808 P.2d at 
146. Instead of focusing on a particular public concern, such as 
drunk driving, officers at the Utah roadblock checked all 
vehicles except large trucks for licenses, registration, 
equipment problems, driver sobriety, and signs of illicit drugs, 
without any suspicion of wrongdoing. The process by which the 
3
 On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the roadblock violated the 
Michigan Constitution. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 
485 N.W.2d 135 (Mich. App. 1992). 
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roadblock was authorized also lacked features of political 
accountability that were arguably present in Sitz, and there was 
no indication that the process of authorization involved any 
balancing of fourth amendment interests against law enforcement 
interests. Id. at 146-47. 
After explaining that in its view Sitz requires that 
there be "explicit guidelines, developed in a politically 
accountable manner that includes balancing of the relevant 
concerns . . . [as] a prerequisite to any judicial balancing 
analysis of a suspicionless roadblock," the Sims Court held that 
the roadblock violated the fourth amendment. 
However, this Court did not limit its analysis to the 
federal constitution. It further stated that "[c]onsistent with 
our supreme court's emphasis on the warrant requirement [in 
Larocco], . . . we hold that suspicionless, investigatory motor 
vehicle roadblocks, conducted without legislative authorization, 
are per se unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution." Id. at 149. In so doing, this Court sought 
to clarify the Sitz requirement that suspicionless investigative 
roadblocks be the product of a politically accountable process. 
It explained that "the legislature [should] perform the Sitz-type 
balancing function if and when it decides to consider the 
authorization of such roadblocks." Id. Consequently, this Court 
in Sims acted within the narrow exception articulated in Watts 
because it retrieved the legislative function that the Sitz Court 
had inexplicably placed in the hands of law enforcement and 
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returned it to its proper guardian -- the Utah State Legislature. 
In so doing, this Court ended any confusion about how the 
balancing test described in Sitz was to be applied and what 
entities would be deemed "politically accountable" under the Sitz 
standard. 
The plurality opinion in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 466 (Utah 1990), though clearly not the law in Utah because 
it does not represent the view of a majority of the Utah Supreme 
Court4, is nevertheless helpful in understanding the parameters 
of the Watts exception. In Larocco, Justices Durham and 
Zimmerman formed a plurality and rejected the rationale of New 
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). In so doing, the Larocco 
plurality joined several other jurisdictions in holding that the 
opening of a car door to inspect a vehicle identification 
constituted a search under the state constitution, even though 
such conduct was deemed not to be a search under the fourth 
amendment in Class. The Larocco plurality then deemed the search 
unreasonable under because it was conducted without a warrant and 
there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless 
search. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-71. 
4
 See Sims v. State Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6, 15-6 (Utah 
1992), Stewart, J., concurring in result, (Larocco state 
constitutional analysis "did not represent the views of a 
majority of this Court"); Poole, 234 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, 
Stewart, J., concurring, (emphasizing that he concurred only in 
the result reached in Larocco and expressly stating that his vote 
did not indicate an acceptance of the state constitutional theory 
asserted therein). 
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In deciding to depart from the federal standard, 
Justice Durham provided an in depth discussion of the United 
States Supreme Court's "inconsistent treatment of the fourth 
amendment" and explained the conflict between the Court's 
"reasonableness" approach as applied in some fourth amendment 
cases and its "warrant" approach as applied in other fourth 
amendment cases. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 466-67. After documenting 
the problems created by the United States Supreme Court's 
"vacillation between the warrant approach and the reasonableness 
approach" in the context of automobile searches, the Larocco 
plurality concluded: 
The time has come for this court, in 
applying an automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement of article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution, to try to simplify, 
if possible, the search and seizure rules so 
that they can be more easily followed by the 
police and the courts and, at the same time, 
provide the public with consistent and 
predictable protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. This can be 
accomplished by eliminating some of the 
confusing exceptions to the warrant 
requirement that have been developed by 
federal law in recent years. 
Id. at 469 (citation omitted). The plurality then stated that it 
would "continue to use the concept of expectation of privacy as a 
suitable threshold criterion for determining whether article I, 
section 14 is applicable," but departed from federal law by 
holding that "if article I, section 14 applies, warrantless 
searches will be permitted only where they satisfy their 
traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety of the 
police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence." 
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Id. at 469-70 (citations omitted). 
Considered collectively, Watts, Thompson, Sims and the 
Larocco plurality make clear that article I, section 14 should 
generally be interpreted as is the fourth amendment by the 
federal courts. Only in those infrequent instances where the 
federal courts have vacillated between various standards such 
that "the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations [of] the 
fourth amendment" Watts, 750 P.2d at n. 8, have become so 
prevalent that it is necessary "to simplify . . . the search and 
seizure rules so that they can be more easily followed by the 
police and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public 
with consistent and predictable protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures," Larocco 794 P.2d at 469, should Utah 
courts embark upon a journey into article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. Defendant has advanced no such claim in this 
case, and it is clear that federal courts have uniformly applied 
the Schneckloth voluntariness test for consent searches. This 
Court should therefore hold that there is not basis for departing 
from Schneckloth under the narrow Watts exception. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF THE WATTS THRESHOLD TEST FOR 
DEPARTING FROM THE FEDERAL VOLUNTARINESS 
STANDARD FOR CONSENSUAL SEARCHES WERE 
SATISFIED, ADOPTION OF DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE ANALYSIS CALLED FOR 
UNDER STATE V. BOBO 
If this Court decides that the Watts requirements for 
departing from fourth amendment interpretation have been met, 
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then it should look to its opinion in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 
1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1990) for further guidance on the question 
of whether defendant's proposed interpretation of article I, 
section 14 should be adopted. As demonstrated below, all of the 
Bobo factors militate against departure from the federal 
standard. 
The question of whether article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution requires that the State prove that a defendant 
was aware of his right to decline a request to search before 
consent to that search may be deemed valid was first raised in 
Bobo. In Bobo, this Court refused to reach the issue because of 
inadequate briefing. Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272.5 However, in a 
footnote, the Bobo court suggested a three part analysis to 
employ when advancing novel state constitutional arguments: 1) 
Counsel should offer analysis of the unique context in which 
Utah's constitution developed; 2) Counsel should demonstrate that 
state appellate courts regularly interpret even textually similar 
state constitutional provisions in a manner different from their 
federal counterparts; and 3) Citation should be made to authority 
from other states supporting the particular construction urged by 
counsel. Id. at 1272 n.5. An analysis of defendant's proposed 
construction of article I, section 14 demonstrates that there is 
5
 The same issue, as well as the question of whether a 
Miranda-type warning should be required like that advocated by 
defendant, also was presented in State v. Hewitt, 814 P.2d 1222 
(Utah App. 1992). In Hewitt, this Court properly declined to 
address the state constitutional issue because the State conceded 
that defendant's consent was involuntary under the fourth 
amendment and that suppression was required. Id. at 1224 n. 1. 
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no basis for departing from the federal standard for determining 
voluntariness of consent to a search. 
1. The Historical Context Surrounding the Adoption of 
Article I, Section 14 Weighs Against Departing from the 
Federal Standard for Determining Voluntariness of a 
Consent to Search. 
The first factor to consider in evaluating a state 
constitutional argument under Bobo is the historical context in 
which the particular provision under review was adopted. 
Defendant appears to argues, with little elaboration, that 
because the Utah Constitution was drafted during an era of 
popular mistrust and hostility toward government, "[g]iving the 
people broader protections under Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution is consistent with the historical development 
of the Utah Constitution." See Brief of Appellant at 15-16. 
While at first blush defendant's argument may have some appeal, 
closer scrutiny reveals that it is significantly flawed. 
If the framers of Utah's constitution were dissatisfied 
with the scope of protection provided by the fourth amendment, 
one would have expected them to draft a textually different 
search and seizure provision rather than adopting language that 
is nearly identical to that of the fourth amendment. Indeed, a 
review of the history of article I, section 14 also indicates 
that the framers of Utah's constitution did not intend Utah's 
search and seizure provision to be interpreted differently than 
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its federal counterpart.6 
The development of Utah's search and seizure provision 
prior to the adoption of article I, section 14 reflects a steady 
movement by the framers toward adoption of the precise wording of 
the fourth amendment. (See Addendum D of this brief for a 
textual history of article I, section 14.) With each progressive 
revision of Utah's search and seizure provision, its language 
became more similar to that of the fourth amendment. Only its 
original version, that of 1849, is significantly different from 
the fourth amendment. That language was jettisoned in 1872 in 
favor of language very similar that of the fourth amendment. 
Each successive revision from that point forward constituted only 
minor stylistic changes until the current provision, which is 
virtually identical to the fourth amendment, was adopted in 1895. 
That the framers of the Utah Constitution essentially adopted the 
fourth amendment is significant because it suggests an intent to 
provide protections equivalent to those provided under the 
federal provision. 
In contrast, it is obvious that when they were 
concerned about the trampling of particular individual rights by 
State authorities, the framers signaled that concern by drafting 
6
 The only reference to article I, section 14 at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1895 was as follows: 
The Chairman: Gentlemen, we will take up section 14, 
Section 14 was read and passed without amendment. 
1 Official Report of Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 
1895 319 (1898). 
24 
extensive protective provisions that were textually distinct from 
those of the federal constitution. For instance, the provisions 
of the Utah Constitution that deal with religious freedom and 
other inalienable rights are very different from their federal 
counterparts. See Utah Const, art. I, §§ 1 & 4. Instead of 
adopting the language of the first amendment, the framers of 
Utah's constitution drafted detailed religious freedom and 
separation of church and state provisions in order to demonstrate 
to the citizens, and to congress, that religious tyranny would 
not be tolerated in Utah. Ibid. See generally Society of 
Separationists v. Whitehead, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 (Utah 1993) 
(detailing history of Utah with respect to development of Utah 
Const, art. I, §§ 1 & 4). Were the framers similarly concerned 
about the adequacy of the protections afforded citizens under the 
fourth amendment, then article I, section 14 surely would feature 
more detailed and expansive language than that of the fourth 
amendment. Instead, the framers drafted a search and seizure 
provison that, except for some minor grammatical changes, was 
identical to the fourth amendment and then adopted it without 
comment. See note 6, supra. 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court have 
opined that the drafters of article I, section 14 intended that 
it be construed differently than the fourth amendment. Indeed, 
Utah's court have implicitly recognized that there is nothing in 
Utah's history, and especially the history of article I, section 
14, that justifies departing from the federal search and seizure 
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standards developed under the fourth amendment. As discussed 
under Point II, instead of relying upon the historical context in 
which article I, section 14 was adopted as the basis for 
rejecting federal search and seizure law, Utah's courts have 
departed from the federal standards only in the limited 
circumstances articulated in Watts. See Thompson, 810 P.2d at 
418; Sims, 808 P.2d at 149. See also Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469 
(plurality opinion). 
2. Although the Language of Article I, Section 14 is 
Nearly Identical to that of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Utah Provision May Be Interpreted Differently From the 
Federal Provision Under the Narrow Circumstances 
Articulated in State v. Watts. 
According to Bobo, the second factor to analyze in 
developing novel state constitutional arguments is the appellate 
treatment of state constitutional provisions that are textually 
similar to their federal counterparts. As previously explained, 
the Utah Supreme Court articulated its position with respect to 
how article I, section 14 should be interpreted in Watts. A 
review of case law from other jurisdictions indicates that, 
although Schneckloth has been the target of some criticism among 
commentators7, that criticism has remained almost exclusively 
academic. Schneckloth continues to enjoy near universal 
acceptance among the state courts. 
7
 See, e.g., 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise On 
The Fourth Amendment, § 8.1(a), at 152-154 (2d ed. 1987). But 
see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 55, 218-19 
(1973) (although critical of some of the Court's reasoning, the 
author concludes "the ultimate result in Bustamonte appears to be 
correct"). 
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3. Nearly Every Jurisdiction Continues to Follow the 
Totality of Circumstances Test for Voluntariness 
Enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 
The final factor identified by this Court in Bobo for 
the analysis of novel state constitutional arguments is citation 
to authority from other states supporting the particular 
construction urged by counsel. Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272-73 n.5. 
Under this "sibling state" approach, particular attention should 
be given to those states whose constitutions served as models for 
the Utah Constitution, as well as to authority from states in the 
same geographical region. See State v. Jewitt, 146 Vt. 221, 500 
A.2d 233, 237 (1985) (describing "sibling state" approach) (cited 
in Bobo, 803 P.2d at 1272-73 n.5). Some commentators have 
identified several states whose constitutions served as models 
for the framers of the Utah Constitution: Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, 
New York, and Washington.8 A review of decisions from the 
courts of these states indicates that none have adopted positions 
that support defendant's proposed interpretation of Article I, 
Section 14. 
Those commentators who have suggested that the Illinois 
Constitution served as a model for the Utah Constitution 
apparently have done so because many Mormon leaders had 
experience with the Illinois government from their time in 
Nauvoo, Illinois. At least one commentator has argued, however, 
8
 See Ken Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure 
Jurisprudence Under the Utah State Constitution, Article I, 
Section 14, 17 Utah J. Contemporary L. 267, 282 (1991), 
hereinafter, "Wallentine," and authorities cited therein. 
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that the search and seizure provision of the Illinois 
constitution "does not appear to be the model for article I, 
section 14" because its wording is "substantially different" from 
the Utah provision. See Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation 
of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State 
Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751, 801 
(1993), hereinafter "Cassell." In any event, even before 
Schneckloth was decided, Illinois refused "to require that the 
People show that the consenting party was advised of rights 
secured by the fourth amendment, [but] the failure to do so is a 
factor bearing on the understanding [of the] nature of the 
consent." People v. Haskell, 41 111.2d 25, 31, 241 N.E.2d 430, 
434 (1968) (citations omitted). Illinois now applies the 
voluntariness standard articulated in Schneckloth. Seef e.g., 
People v. Sesmas, 591 N.E.2d 918 (Ill.App. 1992) ("Moreover, 
ignorance of knowledge of the right to refuse to consent does not 
vitiate the voluntariness of the consent but is merely a factor 
to consider.") (citations omitted). 
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court has stated that 
the search and seizure provisions of the 
United States and Iowa Constitutions contain 
identical language. Consequently, they 
generally are "deemed to be identical in 
scope, import, and purpose." 
State v. Bishop, 387 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Iowa 1986) (citations 
omitted). In keeping with its general rule, Iowa has adopted 
Schneckloth and has expressly noted that "knowledge of the right 
to refuse consent is only one factor to be considered in 
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answering the question of voluntariness." State v. Ecre, 274 
N.W.2d 350, 353 (Iowa 1979) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 
93 S. Ct. at 2047-48) . 
Washington does not appear to have expressly considered 
departing from Schneckloth. Rather, it has consistently applied 
the totality of circumstances test for determining voluntariness 
of consent. See, e.g.. State v. Nelson, 734 P.2d 516, 519-520 
(Wash. 1987) (citing Schneckloth and several Washington cases in 
which Schneckloth was applied). It should be noted, however, 
that while the Washington Constitution may have served as a guide 
for the Utah framers generally, Professor Cassell persuasively 
argues that "Washington's Constitution was plainly not the basis 
for article I, section because Washington adopted much broader 
protection of personal privacy than did Utah." Cassell, supra at 
801. 
Of those states whose constitutions served as a model 
for the Utah Constitution, New York appears to have been the most 
willing to depart from federal search and seizure law. See 
Wallentine, supra at 283 (citing several New York cases to 
support the proposition that "New York courts had consistently 
interpreted the New York Constitution as offering significantly 
greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
than does the fourth amendment"). The obvious problem with 
Wallentine's citation to the New York Constitution as a possible 
influence on the framers of article I, section 14 is that "New 
York did not adopt a constitutional prohibition against 
29 
unreasonable searches and seizures until well after the Utah 
Constitution was adopted." Cassell, supra at 801 (footnote 
omitted). See also New York Const, art. I, § 12 (adopted Nov. 8, 
1938). Moreover, despite their willingness to depart from 
federal search and seizure law in other contexts, New York courts 
continue to apply the Schneckloth standard to evaluate consensual 
searches. See, e.g., People v. Khatib, 555 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 
(Sup. 1990) (applying Schneckloth and citing several other New 
York cases in which Schneckloth was applied). 
Professor Cassell suggests in his article that the 
Nevada Constitution is a "plausible source for article I, section 
14 [.]" Cassell, supra, at 802. He bases that conclusion on the 
fact that the Nevada Constitution of 1864 was "a principle 
reference work" for the framers and because "it appears that 
Utah's draft Constitution of 1872 incorporated Nevada's search 
and seizure guarantee." Id. (footnotes omitted). It was not 
until the Utah draft Constitution of 1895 that Utah's search and 
seizure provision was altered slightly, possibly to complete a 
"stylistic cleanup." Id. at 802-03. If Cassell is correct, then 
how Nevada courts have interpreted that state's search and 
seizure provision may be of particular interest under the Bobo 
analysis. 
Nevada has expressly adopted the Schneckloth standard 
for determining voluntariness of consent. Reese v. State, 596 
P.2d 212, 214 (Nev. 1979). In so doing, the Nevada Supreme Court 
recognized that one state, New Jersey, had departed from 
30 
Schneckloth under its state constitution. JEd. (citing State v. 
Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)). Nevertheless, the 
Reese court reaffirmed its adherence to Schneckloth, noting that 
11
 [t] his court has never indicated that a different standard 
should apply in this state, but is in accord with the rule that 
voluntariness [of consent] is a question of fact to be determined 
from all the circumstances." Id. (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). Nevada continues to follow Schneckloth. 
Passama v. State, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (Nev. 1987). 
Just as none of the states whose constitutions served 
as models for the Utah constitution have adopted positions that 
support defendant's proposed interpretation of Article I, Section 
14, nor have any of the western states departed from Schneckloth. 
See, e.g., State v. Paredes, 810 P.2d 607, 610 (Ariz. App. 
1991)9; People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 994 (Cal. 1992); State v. 
Bedolla, 806 P.2d 588, 593 n.2 (N.M. App. 1991); Stamper v. 
State, 662 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 1983) (all applying Schneckloth). 
Even before Schneckloth was decided, a number of western states 
rejected the suggestion that police be required to inform a 
suspect that he had the right to refuse the officer's request for 
consent to search. See Schneckloth, 93 S. Ct. at 2050 n.14 
9
 See also State v. Knaubert, 550 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Ariz. 
1976) ("Defendant has cited no authority [for the proposition] 
that the Arizona Constitution requires that the record show that 
an in custody defendant knew that he had the right to refuse to 
consent to the search. Absent such authority, we are unwilling 
to apply a more stringent requirement under the Arizona 
Constitution than is imposed by the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.") (emphasis added). 
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(citing cases from California, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, 
Nebraska and Oregon, among others). None of these states appear 
to have since departed from their original positions or from 
Schneckloth. 
More importantly, several of Utah's neighboring states 
have expressly refused to depart from Schneckloth under their 
state constitutions. See, e.g.. People v. Havhurst, 571 P.2d 
721, 724 n.4 (Colo. 1977) (refusing to require Miranda-type 
warning under the state constitution and citing several pre-
Schneckloth Colorado decisions for the same proposition); 
University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 946 (Colo. 1993) 
(Colorado continues to applies Schneckloth); State v. 
Christofferson, 610 P.2d 515, 517 (Idaho 1980) (refusing to 
require defendants be advised of their right to refuse consent 
under state constitution and reaffirming its adoption of the 
federal standard); State v. Stemple, 646 P.2d 539, 541 (Mont. 
1982) (refusing to impose a stricter standard under the Montana 
Constitution than that required under Schneckloth); State v. 
Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (Or. 1977); (declining to interpret 
state constitution more restrictively than fourth amendment and 
rejecting Miranda-type warning requirement); State v. Bea, 864 
P.2d 854, 860-61 (Or. 1993) (Oregon continues to apply 
Schneckloth). 
Expanding the scope of inquiry to include the rest of 
the states, it is clear that Schneckloth enjoys near universal 
acceptance. At least four additional states have refused to 
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interpret their state constitutions as requiring a more stringent 
standard of voluntariness than that required under the fourth 
amendment. See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979) 
(After noting that the language of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Alaska Constitution is almost identical to the fourth amendment, 
the court held that " [t]he Court in Schneckloth rejected the 
argument [that the state must prove that defendant knew of his 
right to refuse consent to the search], and we do not believe 
that the Alaska Constitution requires a different standard for 
noncustodial consent searches."); King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 386, 
389 (Ark. 1977) ("In our view the Schneckloth standard of 
required proof in consent to search is adequate under the terms 
of our constitution. Art. 2, § 15, Ark. Const. (1874)."); State 
v. Osborne, 402 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H. 1979) (refusing to impose 
heavier burden under the New Hampshire Constitution than that 
required under Schneckloth); State v. Sullivan, 534 A.2d 384, 387 
(N.H. 1987) (New Hampshire applies Schneckloth standard); State 
v. Rodaers, 349 N.W.2d 453, 459 (Wis. 1984) (declining to adopt 
different definition of consent under state constitution than 
that required under fourth amendment). 
Although one court has said that "it would be a good 
policy for police officers to advise persons that they have a 
right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search [even though 
that procedure is not] constitutionally required," Osborne, 4 02 
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A.2d at 498,10 the Schneckloth standard for determining 
voluntariness of consent enjoys overwhelming acceptance among the 
states. See also Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 781 n.5 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (noting that warning of right to refuse 
consent is "good police practice," but nevertheless embracing 
Schneckloth). Moreover, the State has been unable to find even a 
single court that has decided to require law enforcement to give 
suspects a Miranda-type consent warning.11 Indeed, it appears 
that only two states, Mississippi and New Jersey, have departed 
from Schneckloth. See State v. Ellis, 586 A.2d 876 (N.J.Super. 
1990), and State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1977) (under the 
New Jersey Constitution, the validity of a consent to search, 
even in a noncustodial situation, must be measured in terms of 
waiver, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right 
to refuse consent); Lonastreet v. State, 592 So.2d 16, 19 (Miss. 
1991) ("[V]alid consent to an otherwise illegal search must be 
accompanied by a knowledgeable waiver of a person's 
constitutional right not to be searched. . . . In other words, 
for a search which is based on consent alone, it is necessary 
that the person searched be aware of the right to refuse under 
10
 But as previously noted, even the court in Osborne 
refused to depart from Schneckloth under its state constitution. 
Osborne, 402 A.2d at 497. 
11
 After Miranda was decided, at least one commentator 
predicted that courts would require that police give a "Miranda-
type" warning when requesting consent to search. See Wilberding, 
"Miranda-Type Warnings for Consent Searches?", 47 N.D.L.Rev. 281, 
284 (1971). Nevertheless, the concept of Miranda-type warnings 
for consent searches has been universally rejected by the courts. 
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the law.") (emphasis in original) (citing Penick v. State, 440 
So.2d 547, 550-51 (Miss. 1983)). Neither New Jersey nor 
Mississippi have, however, gone so far as to require that police 
give a Miranda-type warning like that proposed by defendant, and, 
as noted above, numerous courts have rejected that concept. 
In sum, nothing in Utah's history, especially the 
history of article I, section 14, indicates that the framers 
intended that article I, section 14 be interpreted any 
differently than the fourth amendment. Indeed, the steady 
progression toward language that is virtually identical to the 
fourth amendment suggests the contrary. While the Utah Supreme 
Court has allowed for a narrow basis for departing from fourth 
amendment jurisprudence despite that similarity, such action is 
not warranted in this context. As its near universal acceptance 
demonstrates, the Schneckloth standard has been uniformly applied 
since its inception. No state has adopted the Miranda-type 
warning advocated by defendant; only two have even departed from 
Schneckloth in any respect. Accordingly, even under the Bobo 
analysis, there is no basis for interpreting article I, section 
14 in a manner different from the fourth amendment as defendant 
argues. In fact, all of the Bobo factors weigh in favor of 
rejecting defendant's proposed interpretation of article I, 
section 14. This Court should therefore uphold the trial court's 
decision to follow the general rule of interpreting article I, 
section 14 consistent with the fourth amendment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to 
suppress and affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30^day of June, 1994 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZ: 
Assistant Attorney General 
Appeals Division 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed via first class mail to 
Stephen R. McCaughey and G. Fred Metos, attorneys for appellant, 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this 3&&day of June, 1994. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 920133 
vs. 
JAMES JOHN CONTREL, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant. 
Having received and considered defendant's Motion to suppress, together with 
memoranda both in support and in opposition to the motion, and after an evidentiary hearing 
of the matter, the Court hereby denies the motion. The Court finds that the officers involved 
in this case had a reasonable and articulable suspicion justifying the stop pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 77-7-15 (1953 as amended) and that the officers conducted the subsequent search of 
defendant's vehicle based on defendant's consent and voluntary waiver of his Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
Defendant contends that the evidence at issue in this case was obtained by way of an 
illegal stop. However, it is clear that: 
. . . An officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must 
srcr 
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop. 
Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds 
that the officers' suspicion that defendant was transporting contraband in a concealed 
compartment of the modified vehicle was both reasonable and articulable based on the 
officers' observations and experience. At the hearing of this matter, Sergeant Mangelson 
testified that he made several observations prior to stopping the vehicle: 
1. The vehicle was a 1990 Chevrolet pickup. 
2. The edge of the rear bumper had been bent so as to conceal the area behind it. 
3. The gas tank was much lower than that of a stock model truck. 
4. The vehicle had been recently undercoated (observable in the rear tire area). 
5. Unlike stock model vehicles, the vehicle had no air space between the truck 
bed and the frame. 
6. The vehicle also had bright yellow, over-sized shock absorbers, a bed liner, 
and a tool box in the bed area. 
Based on the foregoing observations, Sgt. Mangelson noted that the vehicle was 
identical in every respect (except for its color) to a vehicle seized several months earlier 
containing a secret compartment behind the bumper in which Mangelson had discovered large 
quantities of contraband. From his personal experience with this prior case, Mangelson 
learned that the sole apparent purpose for many of the unique modifications enumerated 
above was to conceal and transport contraband. Based upon this specific prior personal 
experience with a virtually identical modified vehicle, the sergeant's suspicion was 
reasonable. 
The fact that the stop was "temporary" and lasted no longer than necessary to 
"effectuate the purpose of the stop" is evident from defendant's admission that "Sergeant 
Mangelson requested the consent to search immediately after stopping the vehicle." 
(Defendant's memorandum, page 17). 
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Although defendant does not deny that he gave his consent to search the vehicle both 
orally and in writing, he contends that his consent should somehow be invalidated because 
the officers did not explicitly inform him that he could refuse his consent. Defendant's 
position is that because he was not informed of his right to refuse his consent, the consent 
did not constitute a "knowing" waiver of such right. However, defendant cites no Utah 
authority for his position. In fact, defendant admits that a showing of defendant's 
"knowledge" is not a requirement for a valid waiver under either the federal Constitution 
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218 (1973)) or under the apparent "majority" of 
the state constitutions of other jurisdictions. (Defendant's Memorandum pages 10, 14). The 
only constitutional requirement is that defendant's waiver be voluntary. Based on the 
evidence presented it is evident that defendant voluntarily waived his rights upon giving his 
written consent. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Court finds no 
justification for interpreting the Utah Constitution as providing broader protections than those 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 
At any rate, even if this Court were required to make a finding regarding defendant's 
"knowledge" of his waived rights, the Court would be inclined to find that defendant was in 
fact aware of his right to withhold his consent before giving his written consent in this case. 
Based on the foregoing the Court must conclude that the officer's search of 
defendant's car did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the 
evidence discovered thereby will not be suppressed. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent 
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 17th day of February, 1993. 
f. HARDING, JUD 
cc: Donald J. Eyre Jr., Esq. 
Stephen R. McCaughey, Esq. 
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Addendum B 
Trial Court's Order Denying Motion to Supress 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
CleA of District Own, Juab Coumy 
FILED 
APR 12 m 
D
«t P r w n ww4 ei~v .Deootv 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES JOHN CONTREL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 920133 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
previously entered by the Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Dated this ^ day of CfdHCtL^ . 1993, 
Addendum C 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623-1141 
Clerk of District Court, Ju*b County 
FILED 
APR 1 2 Q93 
^P<W****vt « • * ttetmty 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES JOHN CONTREL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 920133 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
October 22, 1992 upon the Defendant's Motion to Suppress before the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorneys, Stephen R. McCaughey and Barry 
Witlin. The State of Utah was represented by Donald J. Eyre Jr., 
Juab County Attorney. 
The Court having heard the evidence introduced by both the 
plaintiff and defendant, reviewed the Memorandums of Law and 
arguments of counsel, and having submitted its Memorandum Decision. 
The Court being fully advised in the premises makes the 
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following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 4, 1992 Sergeant Paul Mangelson, a 25 year 
veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol was patrolling 1-15 within Juab 
County together with Trooper Lance Bushnell. 
2. Both Sergeant Kangelson and Trooper Bushnell have had 
extensive training and experience in the area of drug law 
enforcement and drug identification. Sergeant Mangelson has been 
involved in many cases involving compartments within motor vehicles 
used to conceal controlled substances. 
3. While patrolling, Sergeant Mangelson observed a northbound 
pickup truck, and made the following observations prior to stopping 
the vehicle: 
a. The vehicle was a 1990 Chevrolet pickup. 
b. The edge of the rear bumper had been bent so as to 
conceal the area behind it. 
c. The gas tank was much lower than that of a stock model 
truck. 
d. The vehicle had been recently undercoated (observable in 
the rear tire area). 
e. Unlike stock model vehicles, the vehicle had no air space 
between the truck bed and the frame. 
f. The vehicle also had bright yellow, oversized shock 
2 
&3 
absorbers, a bed liner, and a tool box in the bed area. 
4. Sergeant Mangelson noted that the vehicle was identical 
in every respect (except for its color) to a vehicle he had seized 
several months earlier containing a secret compartment behind the 
bumper in which Mangelson had discovered large quantities of 
contraband. 
5. Based upon Sergeant Mangelson's observations and his past 
experience, the officers stopped the vehicle, with the intent to 
search the vehicle for a hidden compartment. 
6. The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, James John 
Contrel. The driver produced a Florida driver's license and a 
Pennsylvania registration. The driver said the vehicle belonged 
to his friend Carmen, but he did not know Carmen's address or 
telephone number. 
7. The officer asked the defendant if he was transporting 
drugs or if there were any firearms or contraband in the vehicle. 
The defendant replied "No". The officer then asked for consent to 
search the vehicle. The defendant gave consent to search the 
vehicle, both orally and in writing. 
8. The officers then went to the rear of the vehicle and 
accessed the secret compartment, exactly as Sergeant Mangelson did 
in the previous case, and after they removed the cover plate, found 
in excess of 100 lbs. of marijuana in the hidden compartment. The 
defendant was thereafter arrested. 
3. 
Pursuant to the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The stop of the subject vehicle was a constitutionally 
valid stop based upon reasonable suspicion that the subject vehicle 
had a hidden compartment containing contraband. 
2. The detainment of the defendant after the stop was 
reasonable to effectuate the purpose of the stop. 
3. The defendant's consent to search the vehicle and waiver 
of his constitutional rights was voluntary. 
4. Although a knowing waiver of his constitutional rights 
under the U.S. and Utah Constitution is not necessary when giving 
a consent to search, the defendant in this case did make a knowing 
waiver when he gave his written consent. 
5. The defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
L$ 
Addendum D 
Textual History of Utah Const. Art. I, § 14 
I, HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION IN UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The following history may be found at the Utah State 
Archives under the title "Constitution State of Deseret and Utah 
Constitutions, Memorials to Congress, and Proceedings of 
Convention 1849-1959," Microfilm Document No. 080979, C. Reel I 
(1849-1895), Utah State Archives No. 700-0000-1400: 
1. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution of the 
State of Deseret (1849): 
The people shall be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and possessions, from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
2. Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of the 
State of Deseret (1872) : 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not 
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place or places to be searched, and the 
person or persons, and thing or things, to be 
seized. 
3. Article I, Section 16 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (1882): 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not 
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place or places to be searched, and the 
person or persons, and thing or things, to be 
seized. 
4. Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (1887) : 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not 
be violated, and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
5. Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah (1895) (current provision): 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable seizures and searches shall not 
be violated; and not warrant shall issue but 
on probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, house, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
